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Guy Standing*
The world is in the midst of a Global Transformation, reflecting the painful creation of a global
market society. Globalization was the disembedded phase, in which inequalities and
insecurities multiplied as national systems of regulation, social protection and redistribution
were dismantled or broke down. This reflected the collapse of labourism and systems of
industrial citizenship, and an end to the building of national welfare states as the development
objective. The outcomes were unsustainable. But what should be the counter-movement by
which the global economic system will be re-embedded in society? This article suggests that a
new approach to social and economic security is required, one that places work and occupation
at the centre of life rather than labour, and one in which universal basic economic security is
the primary development objective. In order to move in that direction, this article advocates the
use of five policy decision principles by which all policies and institutional changes should be
evaluated. It concludes by sketching a progressive strategy oriented to occupational
citizenship, giving equal respect to liberty, equality and fraternity, or social solidarity.
INTRODUCTION
In April 2005, an international conference was convened in New Delhi by the
Institute for Human Development on income security and employment security. It
was graciously opened by the President of India. At the time, there was what
seemed excessive hope and euphoria being placed in the new Indian Government
and, in particular, in the Common Minimum Programme (CMP). It seemed
misconceived, going against the grain of a realistic progressive vision for the twenty-
first century, in India or any other part of the world.
On offer was a paternalistic policy package, which was neither egalitarian nor
universalistic. The answer to the woes of those being left behind by what had been
foolishly called ‘shining India’ was ‘guaranteed employment’. Even if this had
performed precisely as its designers claimed it would, it amounted to a charitable
promise of a spell of doing unattractive labour for unattractive pay.
Progressives everywhere need to fight against paternalistic tendencies, which
often stem from their own class backgrounds. They must combat their paternalistic
demons if they are to forge a new model that will appeal to the emerging socio-
economic groups. In India and elsewhere, escape from paternalism remains an
extraordinarily difficult feat. The sense of social hierarchy is so deeply ingrained that
an agenda for universalism and rights is always in danger of becoming an exercise in
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hypocrisy or one of spewing more elegant prose designed to impress the reader with
the writer’s erudition.
The biggest source of failure of the main twentieth-century progressive model,
social democracy, was its overwhelming emphasis on labour. This set up a trio of
asset-control conflicts that made universalism impossible—between those
representing labour and those representing capital, between those performing labour
and those doing economic activity outside the standard employment relationship
(SER), and between those performing labour and those doing kinds of work that
yielded no direct income. It also cemented an implicit social compact—a social deal of
structured inequality—between those performing labour in the SER and those
earning most of their income from rent or from productive or financial capital. The
state supported and built on that compact, leaving the rest in a position of
disadvantage.
Part of the deal was that SER employees would be protected by labour law,
trade unions, collective bargaining and protective regulations while a socio-
demographic hierarchy would continue—with lower income security and other
forms of security being given to women, migrants, ethnic minorities, lower castes
and others deemed to be outsiders. The welfare states built on those premises were
designed to make the outcomes sufficiently stable as to be sustainable. No welfare
state was built on universalism or equal basic security for all its citizens. Indeed, the
common claim that welfare state capitalism constituted a ‘golden age’ oriented to
labour decommodification is one of the biggest intellectual misrepresentations in
modern history. One notices that almost all apostles of this view have been men.
One last introductory point is in order. When in the early 1980s, I first argued that
economic insecurity was an emerging crisis associated with open economies and
labour market flexibility, there were few voices of support. Most said it was a passing
phase. My thesis was and remains that economic insecurity is actually wanted by the
orthodox economic doctrine, and that we are in the midst of a Global Transformation,
analogous to Karl Polanyi’s Great Transformation, in which old systems of regulation,
redistribution and social protection have broken down, resulting in mass inequalities
and insecurities. These outcomes are non-sustainable, but the old systems will not
solve the problem.
Polanyi’s Transformation was about the painful forging of national markets,
above all about the institutional shaping of national labour markets. We are now in the
midst of an even more painful process, the creation of an international market system.
Contrary to what some observers claim, this is not analogous to the period before
1913; we should look to the emerging characteristics and class configurations for a
progressive response, rather than to the past.
AN EGALITARIAN APPROACH TO SECURITY
A progressive agenda should be concerned with the enhancement of freedom and
with equality. For too long, progressives of the world have been frightened by
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freedom, and have been prone to advocate soft or hard paternalism. In the words used
by the Indian President at the opening of the Conference on Income Security in 2005,
too often progressives, as well as others, have wanted to be visible leaders rather than
invisible facilitators of full freedom.
All theories of justice are built on the belief in the equality of something. The most
credible position is that there should be an equal right to basic economic security—
not equal incomes, not equal wealth, but an equal claim or republican right to basic
security. The term ‘claim right’ signifies that policies should move progressively
towards this right.
How can security be defined? I have used the terms socio-economic security and
economic security (Standing, 2002; ILO, 2004). Others have used the term human
security, which seems rather sweeping. Let us not quibble about that here. In abstract,
security is the ability to survive, reproduce and develop in conditions of adequate, stable
and predictable support, providing circumstances in which to develop human capabilities.
The risks, uncertainties and hazards to which people are exposed should be such as to
be tolerable, and everybody, regardless of social or economic status, should have the
means not only to cope with but also to recover from adverse shocks and the hazards of
life. Note that a security agenda must be concerned with ameliorating all four aspects—
risks, uncertainty, hazards and shocks.
Debates about alternative forms of social protection have assumed an urgency
because globalization and economic informalization appear to involve more
pervasive economic insecurity and inequality. The character of the insecurity has
changed too. Identifying that is a necessary aspect of identifying appropriate policies,
and their likely effects on livelihoods and work patterns.
Briefly, economic insecurity reflects exposure to several forms of risk and
uncertainty and a limited capacity to cope with adverse outcomes and to recover from
those outcomes. To a greater or lesser extent, any individual is exposed to idiosyncratic
risk, that is, the risk of an adverse event that reflects life-cycle contingencies such as a
spell of unemployment, a work-related accident or illness, or a disabling accident.
This is the sphere of classic social security schemes. There is also co-variant risk, that is,
where a risk of one adverse event is tied to the risk of others, where one adverse event
has a high probability of precipitating one or more other mishaps.
This leads to the distinction between shocks and hazards. Shocks have become
more numerous due to globalization and global warming. Included are sharp
economic downturns that sweep whole communities, economies or regions. There
are circumstances that one can characterize as socio-economic disasters, whether they be
quick-onset disasters, as in the cases of earthquakes, floods, tsunamis or a sudden
economic collapse, or slow-onset disasters, as in the case of famines, droughts or an
epidemic such as HIV/AIDS, which threaten the livelihoods and reproductive
capacity of whole communities.
Situations of shock should be distinguished from hazards, which are important
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sources of economic insecurity in developing countries, and which may be defined as
predictable (often desired) life events that have a high probability of an indirect
adverse effect, or a sequence of adverse effects, for an individual or family. They
include the death of a relative, weddings, births, a migration event, and retirement. A
well-known hazard to which Indians are exposed with a potentially catastrophic
outcome is the marriage of a daughter, due to the costs involved. They may be joyous
events, but for some families on the margin, they are hazardous.
With both shocks and hazards, the resultant costs could erode a household’s
capacity to sustain its livelihood base, perhaps by pushing it into debt, into mortgaging
land or by preventing it from buying seeds or fertilisers. Given the high probability of
such events, an insurance policy would entail high premiums or would not be feasible.
For some types of event, an insurance scheme would involve a moral hazard, that is, the
prospect of a compensatory payment would make it more likely that the event would
occur. This would mean that an insurer would wish to monitor people’s behaviour and
the amount of compensation would be linked to proof of actual costs associated with
the event or to some predetermined acceptable level of costs to be covered.
Economic insecurity also arises from uncertainty. With uncertainty, one is unsure
about one’s actual interests or how to realize them. The outcome of decisions cannot
be predicted with confidence; often this is combined with a perceived inability to
know what to do if an adverse outcome materializes. A high degree of uncertainty
pushes people into more risk-averse behaviour, especially if the consequences of an
adverse outcome could be catastrophic. Those producing crops in agrarian economies
or where economic activity is dependent on climate or ecological conditions will face
a high level of uncertainty. Anything that lessened uncertainty could be expected to
have a beneficial effect on higher-yielding investment, innovation and purposive
decision-making.
Security arises from being able to deal with shocks, hazards and uncertainty.
Although it will not be argued at length, it is a premise of this article that basic
economic security is essential for freedom and development, and would enhance the
pursuit of ‘dignified work’. Basic economic security is defined as a threefold set of
circumstances.
It requires limited exposure to idiosyncratic, co-variant and systemic risks,
uncertainty, hazards and shocks. It requires an ability to cope with those if they
materialize. And it requires an ability to recover from those outcomes. It is this last
factor that has been insufficiently emphasized, and relates to the idea of livelihood
regeneration and thus ‘dignified work’.
The relevance of disaggregating economic insecurity is that the main forms have
changed in the Global Transformation. Systemic insecurity and shocks have become
much more common, while the contingency risks that were covered by selective
social security have become secondary. This raises questions about the
appropriateness of the most popular selective schemes for increasing income security.
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Before continuing, a further set of distinctions should be made. We may say that a
scheme is universalistic if it is intended for all the population as a right, though
perhaps based on citizenship or long-term residence. A scheme is targeted if it is
intended for a specific group, defined by a test of eligibility, be it poverty, age,
employment capacity or whatever. A scheme is selective if it uses specified criteria to
determine eligibility, such as a means test or a ‘proxy means test’. A scheme is
conditional if it requires some specified behaviour, usually work-related, on the part of
the intended recipient, or in some cases, the family members of the recipient.
In practice, there are instances of targeted universalistic schemes, in that all
belonging to a social group are made eligible regardless of their means. An example is
the universalistic social pension, which operates in several countries, such as
Namibia and Mauritius. More common at present are targeted selective schemes,
whereby the intended beneficiaries are defined by their social group (for example,
women with young children) and by their poverty (having an income or assets below
some threshold value).
In this regard, means – testing has come in for a great deal of criticism because of
the difficulty of applying meaningful tests in developing countries, where
establishing a person’s income is very difficult, especially as it is likely to fluctuate
erratically and substantially. Such tests are not only inequitable, but often prevent
low-skilled workers, in particular, from being able to take up work opportunities,
through what are known as poverty traps or unemployment traps. As discussed
elsewhere (Standing, 2008), ‘proxy’ means-testing fares no better. Given their
manifest drawbacks, backed by vast empirical evidence, it is remarkable that so many
economists and others have continued to support means-tested schemes.
If universalism is about freedom and equality, then we may say that basic security
is the essence of full freedom, drawing on the terms made famous by Isaiah Berlin—
negative liberty (absence of restraints and unchosen controls, so giving autonomy) and
positive liberty (opportunity and capacity to make rational choices). Neo-classical
economists, neo-liberals and neo-cons focus on negative liberty when talking about
freedom. Egalitarians should focus on both forms. However, they should be careful
about the language of choice. Freedom is not just about making a choice between
consumer goods or jobs. It is about being in situations where it is feasible to make
choices about how to be ethical.
This leads to three dimensions of security. First, if we accept that security is the
base of full freedom, we should accept that “dependent security” or paternalism is
incompatible with security or freedom. If someone is dependent on the good will or
discretion of a potential benefactor, be it a relative such as a husband, a landlord, a
moneylender or the state, that person cannot have full freedom. This is crucial. For
too long progressives have spoken about equality and freedom as if they were in
competition. In the early twentieth century, social democrats took the wrong course
and fell into their self-made trap, by allowing freedom to be constrained ostensibly
in the interest of equality. They never trusted the intelligence of the working classes
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they purported to represent and love. In the process, they lost the debate on
freedom to the political right. This led to the triumph of Hayek in the 1970s, paving
the way for neo-liberalism, when freedom became defined as little more than the
ability to compete.
There should be a presumption that paternalism is incompatible with real
security, unless there is proof that specific forms of behaviour would be harmful to
others, or that particular groups need protection because it has been demonstrated
that they cannot provide it themselves, as with the case of children, the mentally
incapacitated and the frail elderly. Even in those cases, the burden of proof should be
placed on the paternalists.
Second, security is not an individualistic agenda about individual autonomy
outside a socio-institutional context. It depends on possessing a sense of identity—I am
a somebody, with self-respect, with desirable relationships and capabilities, in self-
control—but in a specific social context. In the era of Polanyi’s Transformation, people
were encouraged to identify themselves by their industrial class. They drew social
entitlements from whether or not they were employees in the standard employment
relationship. It may have been a form of alienation, but a sense of identity existed. The
vision was of individuals belonging to a class. The challenge now stems from the fact
that the vision of an industrial working class has faded into the history books.
Third, security requires a sense of social solidarity, requiring institutions of
reciprocity and mechanisms to strengthen what Aristotle called philia, civic friendship.
This was glossed over in social democracy, with the presumption that trade unions,
industrial enterprises and collective bodies representing employers were sufficient.
We will come back to that later.
If universal security is about freedom, identity and solidarity—or community—
one should acknowledge a caveat, which underpins what might be called the
dialectics of security. What is at issue is a claim right to universal basic security, not
total security. One can have too much as well as too little. Excessive security may lead
to indolence, irresponsibility and opportunism. This is one reason for favouring a cap
on incomes and wealth. Usually, the damage that a very rich madman can do is much
greater than the damage that a poor man can do. What we should argue for is
universal basic economic security.
Now, suppose that one is an egalitarian and that one subscribes to the view that
universal basic security is the objective. Are there any criteria compatible with
egalitarianism and universalism by which we could evaluate all policy proposals and
institutional changes? Let me propose five Policy Decision Principles, drawing from
several philosophical traditions.
The Security Difference Principle
A policy or institutional change is socially just only if it improves the security and
work prospects of the least secure groups in society.
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This is a starting point, even if it invites Paretian-type concerns about inter-personal
comparisons. An egalitarian can assert that if equal basic security is the primary
objective, then reducing the insecurity of the most insecure groups should have
priority, and any action that worsens their security should be regarded critically. So,
for instance, if a policy boosted the job opportunities of middle-income groups
while worsening those of more disadvantaged groups, that could not be justifiable
unless the losers were compensated in ways they found acceptable. The Security
Difference Principle stems from Rawls (1973), who, from a liberal philosophical
perspective, argued that social and economic inequalities are socially just only if
they allow for the betterment of the worst-off groups in society.
Whether or not one accepts the Rawlsian perspective, in general, this principle
can stand as a moral precept. A policy should be judged by whether it helps the least
secure. If it does not, one should be uneasy (especially if it benefits others who are less
insecure), unless some other principle is recognized that is demonstrably superior. If
so, it would be up to the policy proponent to show that the alternative policy would
yield superior outcomes. A key point is that there should be a right to a minimal
amount of resources so as to enhance the capacity to develop and exercise effective
freedom.
The Paternalism Test Principle
A policy or institutional change is socially just only if it does not impose controls on
some groups that are not imposed on the most free groups in society.
This principle is ignored by too many donors and analysts working comfortably in
affluence. Paternalism is rife in the design and implementation of social protection
policies, and has been re-packaged under the rubric of ‘libertarian paternalism’. It has
worrying overtones of a Benthamite ‘panopticon’ society and the techniques of social
control analysed by Michel Foucault (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Paternalism will be
the biggest intellectual challenge for egalitarians.
According to this principle, forcing people to do certain forms of labour or ‘jobs’
when others are not forced to do them would be counter to social justice, even if the
government authorities genuinely believe that the policy would be for the material
betterment of those required to do them. Underlying this principle is the Millian
liberal view that there is a prima facie case against paternalism (except in the case of
young children and the medically frail), particularly against those forms that
constrain the freedoms of the disadvantaged.
Among other aspects, this principle requires that all groups who could be subject
to paternalistic direction should be enabled to have an effective independent Voice
(collective and individual) in order to represent their interests. Only with such Voice
can people have some semblance of control over their work and lives, and only if they
have control can there be any decent meaning in the ideas of universalism and dignified
work.
46 Indian Journal of Human Development
Relevant to this principle, recent research on happiness has reiterated that people
who have control over their work and life are happier than others, even taking
account of the influence of access to benefits (Haidt, 2006). Control means having the
capacity and opportunity to make decisions for oneself, without that being
determined by the state, or by patriarchal figures or religious or other institutions that
dictate how people must behave.
This principle is particularly important when considering how some
governments, including recent American, British and Australian governments, have
gone about achieving social integration through welfare reforms. It is about ‘effective’
or ‘full’ freedom, for which basic economic security is essential. It also relates to the
notion of identity.
Certain groups have identity thrust upon them, and these tend to seek out a
dependent situation that is scarcely enviable or what could be meant by basic
security. Consider ‘the supplicant beggar’. Surely, no sensible observer could regard
such a person as secure, because even if he were able to occupy the same corner every
day where three benefactors passed by and placed coins in a hat, there would be no
moral bond associated with the charitable act, only humiliation. A beggar must be
careful not to dress too well, beg too aggressively or show insufficient gratitude. The
identity and the agency being shown are those of dependent insecurity.
A peasant migrating into an urban economy may rely on a network of patrons,
intermediaries and brokers (the mastaan of Bangladesh, for example), who may
provide the means of acquiring a job. Again, this is dependent insecurity, because
what is given can be taken away, with interest. Mafioso patrons offer this. They play on
insecurities and manipulate those enticed into their net. Gangster social protection
flourishes in all market societies that universalize insecurity and foster chronic
inequality.
Public works are a benevolent form of the supplicant beggar situation. So is the
philanthropy by the super-rich, the elite of the global order. This leads to the next
principle.
The Rights-Not-Charity Principle
A policy or institutional change is socially just if it enhances the rights of the recipient
of benefits or services and limits the discretionary power of the providers.
This principle is also crucial for assessing the appeal of alternative security-enhancing
schemes, and is particularly relevant in South Asia. A right is possessed as a mark of a
person’s humanity or citizenship, and cannot be made dependent on some
behavioural conditionality. People should not be expected to have to plead for
assistance in times of need, or to rely on the selective benevolence of civil servants or
politicians. Their social entitlements should be rights, not matters for the
discretionary decisions of bureaucrats, philanthropists or aid donors, however well-
meaning those may be. Charity is akin to pity, and pity is akin to contempt. A
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universalistic approach is one that emphasizes compassion and strengthens social
protection through social solidarity and patterns of reciprocity.
The ‘right to work’, much asserted for the past two centuries, is particularly
relevant here. If there is such a right, then there must be an obligation on somebody to
provide work. But who or what is that person or organization? And how could
someone ensure that others respect his or her ‘right’? One cannot sensibly say that
there is a right for every person to be given a job of their unrestrained choice. Not
everybody can be President or Chief Executive. But should someone who is
employing others be obliged to provide them with jobs? The very idea is nonsense.
What one could defend is the principle that everybody should have a claim right
to have an equal good opportunity to pursue and develop their work capabilities.
This equality of opportunity requires policies and institutions to enable everyone to
develop their capacities equally, should they wish to do so. Guaranteeing people
‘jobs’ they do not want is scarcely an affirmation of any right to work. But creating the
space, the security, for them to pursue a dignifying working life surely is.
In this regard, there is much merit in Article 1 of Title 1 of the Charter of Emerging
Human Rights adopted at the Barcelona Social Forum in November 2004, drawn up by
an international group including representatives of all the relevant UN bodies. This
asserts the right to existence under conditions of dignity, comprising rights to security
of life, to personal integrity, to a basic income, to healthcare, to education, to a worthy
death and to work, defined as:
“The right to work, in any of its forms, remunerated or not, which covers the right to
exercise a worthy activity guaranteeing quality of life. All persons have the right to
the fruits of their activity and to intellectual property, under the condition of respect
for the general interests of the community.”
In sum, policies and schemes should be evaluated by whether they strengthen or
weaken movement towards the realization of these rights, with those strengthening
them being preferable to those that do not.
The Ecological Constraint Principle
A policy or institutional change is socially just only if it does not involve an ecological
cost borne by the community or by those directly affected.
Ecological security is something most of us can understand. Smell the air, taste the
water, look for the disappearing species that have shared our world. We are under
threat, and anybody denying the evidence deserves scorn.
This policy decision rule is a quintessential twenty-first century principle. The
potential ecological consequences must be built into the policy, not be put as an
afterthought. For instance, there may be a trade-off between the generation of extra
jobs and the ecological revival of a local area. Does a short-term growth maximization
strategy benefit most of the people living in a country? The commercial drive to
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pursue growth and profits without taking into account social externalities is a recipe
for global ecological disaster.
For evaluation purposes, an ecological constraint principle means that any policy,
such as transfer schemes or job creation schemes, should be subject to the constraint
that they should not deliberately or carelessly jeopardize the environment. For
instance, one could argue that subsidies intended to boost skills, employment or job-
creating investment should be modified to promote only ecologically beneficial work
and skills.
The ecological constraint principle raises emotional reactions, with claims that
any such condition is a protectionist device that penalizes developing countries,
forcing them to slow economic growth and incurring costs that hinder development.
Regrettably, global warming and other forms of pollution—including many
emanating from poor working conditions in the specious interest of job promotion—
will hurt many more people in the developing countries and do so more
devastatingly than in rich countries. The principle must be respected everywhere.
One issue should be confronted by this principle. The globalizing market
economy is awash with selective subsidies, many going to rich companies and rich
individuals. It has been estimated that in developing countries over 6 per cent of GDP
goes to corporations. In many countries, including India, some 3 per cent of GDP goes
in fuel subsidies, which pleases firms that rely on fuel and consumers whose living
costs are held down. But they are neither environmentally or economically sensible
nor universalistic. Subsidies encourage waste, an inefficient and excessive use of the
resource in production, and excessive and inefficient use in consumption.
Egalitarians should be appalled. There are high Type A and Type B errors; the benefit
goes to many people who have no need, and it does not reach many who are in need.
If one were concerned with ‘the poor’ or the insecure, then it would be more efficient
and equitable to give the money directly to the citizens to cover the extra fuel costs
that would come from charging a proper market price. This would have the virtue of
leaving it to the citizen to make choices about how to spend a scarce resource.
The Dignified Work Principle
A policy or institutional change is just only if it does not block people from pursuing
work in a dignified way and if it does not disadvantage the most insecure groups in
that respect.
To some degree, this is incorporated in the Rights-Not-Charity Principle.
However, the two-part test in this principle involves two value judgments—that
work that is dignifying is worth promoting (whereas deterioration in working
conditions or in opportunities would not be), and that the policy should enhance the
range and quality of work options of the most insecure groups relative to others, or
more than for others. While this may seem complicated, the main point is to
determine whether a scheme favours the development of more freely chosen work
opportunities and work capabilities.
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In sum, policies and institutional arrangements can be evaluated using five policy
principles. Identifying trade-offs and setting priorities should be made transparent
and subject to democratic processes. Policies that satisfy all the principles would be
ideal. Although a comparative assessment of policies might be based on more than
the five, they may be regarded as a coherent set of principles consistent with a belief
in complex egalitarianism, in which the expansion of full freedom requires basic
economic security for all.
WHY INDUSTRIAL CITIZENSHIP FAILED
The dominant socio-economic models of the twentieth century—social democracy
and state socialism—promoted neither universalism nor freedom. They promoted
certain forms of security, but these were unsustainable and divisive. Although this
has been analysed at length elsewhere, it is perhaps useful to identify those aspects
that need to be addressed in building a new progressive agenda.1
The models were built on the values of labour, and stemmed from a mode of
thinking drawn from observing the process of industrialization in the nineteenth
century. In Polanyi’s terms, the era of disembeddedness led to mass insecurity and
chronic inequality. To resolve the resultant crisis, a double movement took place,
involving the creation of mechanisms and policies to promote seven forms of labour-
based security (see Box 1).
The drawback was that linking the security to labour was actually inegalitarian
and freedom-constraining. Industrial citizenship gave priority to labour market
security and employment security, the two forms that favoured what was known as the
industrial working class, but which really comprised manual employees in full-time
wage labour. The vital forms of security in any progressive agenda should be income
Box 1: Forms of Labour-based Security
Labour market security—Adequate income-earning opportunities; at the macro-level,
epitomized by a government commitment to Full Employment;
Employment security—Protection against arbitrary dismissal, regulations on hiring and firing,
imposition of costs on employers for failing to adhere to rules, etc.;
Job security—Ability and opportunity to retain a niche, an occupation or ‘career’, plus barriers
to skill dilution, and opportunities for ‘upward’ mobility in terms of status and income, etc.;
Work security—Protection against accidents and illness at work, through, for example, safety
and health regulations, limits on working time, unsociable hours, night work for women, etc.,
as well as compensation for mishaps;
Skill reproduction security—Good opportunity to gain and retain skills, through
apprenticeships, employment training, etc., as well as the opportunity to make use of
competencies;
Income security—Assurance of an adequate and stable income, protection of income through,
for example, minimum wage machinery, wage indexation, comprehensive social security,
progressive taxation to reduce inequality and to supplement low incomes, etc.;
Representation security—Possession of a collective voice in the labour market, through, for
example, independent trade unions, with a right to strike, etc.
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security and voice or representation security. But these were interpreted in a particular
way, being linked to the performance of labour, that is, minimum wages, labour-
based social security and industrial collective bargaining. The outcome was a process
of fictitious labour decommodification, because workers were made dependent on
remaining locked in the labour market in order to receive socio-economic security
(Standing, 2007).
The models were alternative agendas for industrial citizenship, since the pattern
of social solidarity being promoted was associated with performance of industrial
labour. The social democratic variant was built on a system consisting of labour law,
protective regulations, collective bargaining, progressive fiscal policy and labour-
based social security. Most of those were contrary to an ethos of universalism.
Thus, labour law existed alongside common law; it removed the presumption of
equality between contracting parties, on the grounds that workers were the
vulnerable party vis-à-vis ‘capital’. But labour law protected employees in the SER, not
all workers. It divided the working population into deserving and undeserving
groups. Labour regulations had the same divisive character, as did collective
bargaining. Worst of all, the social security systems espoused by Beveridge and
Bismarck and their progeny hinged on the performance of labour. They were as much
a disciplinary regulatory device as they were geared to universal income security.
When the Global Transformation began, they ceased to function efficiently or
equitably, and labour-based social security has been withering ever since.
The industrial citizenship model of social democracy cannot and should not be
restored. Any model of labourism was bound to be stultifying. But the key
development is that its collapse has accompanied a growth in inequality, partly
associated with a restructuring of social income, in which non-wage forms of
remuneration to workers have been shrinking, while reliance on money wages has
increased in a process of labour recommodification. This has concealed the full extent of
the growth of income inequality, especially as privileged groups have been gaining
non-wage benefits, from their corporations, the state or from the stock exchanges,
while employees have been losing enterprise and state benefits.
The starkest stylized fact is the growth of functional income inequality. The returns
to labour have gone down, and the returns to capital have gone up. There are well-
known reasons for this, including the fact that the bargaining position of those
performing labour has steadily weakened while the bargaining position of owners of
capital has sharply increased. While profits have risen, real wages have stagnated or
declined, as they have in Japan, the USA, France and Germany, to name just a few
countries struggling to maintain workers’ living standards.
Behind that shift is the huge increase in global labour supply that has come with
economically open economies, in particular from the emerging industrial workshops
of the world, boxed together, ironically, as ‘Chindia’, along with a few other countries
such as Brazil and Vietnam. The context in which to consider any progressive
response is the strong prospect of a continuing growth in the strength of financial
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capital, coupled with continuing erosion in bargaining capacity on behalf of those
depending on wages for their income security. That might be challenged in the longer
term, but a progressive would surely be well advised to take those current realities as
given for the foreseeable future.
If that is so, one may well argue that the existing distribution system is
unsustainable. The growing inequalities and the associated social and economic
insecurities could foment such social discontent and self-destructive anomic
behaviour that even the winners will be ready to make concessions in the interest of
stability and sustainability. What will be on offer? Before coming to the beginning of
an answer, it might be worth recalling the emerging global class structure, which
highlights the nature of the challenge facing those wishing to promote a freedom-
enhancing universalism.
THE CLASS STRUCTURE IN THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION
We cannot realistically think of any progressive strategy without taking account of
the class structure associated with the Global Transformation. Class has not gone
away just because Marxism has been marginalized. There are groups in society with
distinctive relationships with the key assets and with distinctive sources of income,
status and security.
We may take as given the well-identified rural class structure. But the world is
being divided into a new global class pattern.2 At the top is a tiny elite of ‘global
citizens’, with scarcely imaginable wealth counted in billions or hundreds of millions
of dollars. This super-wealth is obscene. And yet one will look in vain for a policy
agenda that sets out a strategy to combat the mechanisms that produce this obscenity.
Discreet silence is the order of the day. That should stop.
Below that elite, in terms of income, status and economic security, are the salariat
and a growing body of what may be called proficians, the former having employment
security and access to extensive employment-related benefits as well as high salaries,
the latter trading off employment security for income and occupational freedom
through a work-style of consultancies, short-term contracts and multiple work
activities. Many of the growing number of professionals around the world fit into one
or other of these groups. They are economically and psychologically detached from
the mainstream regulatory labour and social security system, with access to private
and/or corporate benefits and privileges.
Below them in the emerging structure is a category that is rapidly becoming a
misnomer, core employees (or workers), those who are mainly doing manual jobs in
stable wage-labour relationships. They constituted the main part of the working class
for which welfare states were designed. They were expected to become the majority
group everywhere. Since the onset of the Global Transformation, their numbers have
been shrinking everywhere, and their securities have shrivelled. The idea of ‘the end
of the working class’ is not too fanciful.
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Many who would have entered or remained in the core have drifted into the next
category, which has been growing hugely in the world economy. This is what should
be called the precariat. The term ‘informal sector’ is inappropriate, for many reasons.
What we are seeing is the spread of precarious labour relationships within and
around even the most ‘formal’ of enterprises and organizations. Those in the precariat
have no control over their working lives, and are subject to several forms of
commodification.3
Finally, there are the unemployed and those detached in a miserable existence long
known as a lumpen proletariat, consisting of anomic, socially detached people living
semi-human lives. Many are the victims of a competitive, individualistic society.
The precariat is where social policy should concentrate, focusing on ways by
which it could obtain income and representation security and, crucially, basic control
over livelihoods and occupations. In the longer term, the goal should be to make the
lifestyles of those in the precariat more like that of the proficians now. At the moment,
the precariat is not just precarious in terms of income and access to jobs. It is insecure
in not having control over its identity and it lacks agency. Unlike proficians, those in
the precariat do not have a sense of occupation, in that they cannot control the way
they combine work and leisure activities to develop their human capacities. A worthy
universalism would be one that enabled them to have control over their own lives.
BUILDING OCCUPATIONAL CITIZENSHIP
The normative vision behind this article is that the way forward is to move from a
model of industrial citizenship to one of occupational citizenship, building up social
protection systems, redistributive systems and regulatory mechanisms around work
and occupation, rather than the performance of labour. The emerging ‘class’ structure
is the context in which that has to be attempted.
In order to revive egalitarianism and universalism, there must be a proper respect
for freedom. This should move beyond liberal versions that emphasize autonomy as
the absence of constraints and the existence of opportunities to participate in the
labour market and make money. Freedom is also about being in situations of being
able to be ethical. This is why institutions and associations are needed to give
meaning to social solidarity and community. Certain types of identity such as those
based on the nation state, or caste or religion, are too diffuse and closed to be reliable
engines of ethical behaviour. Society needs associations that are committed to the
generation and reproduction of human capacities. Those who understand the need
for mechanisms of solidarity and reciprocity should wish to encourage the growth of
the types of associations that could induce people of all walks of life to give respect to
reproductive work as much as to commercially profitable activities that we economists
have over-emphasized.
In that context, consider where we stand. The story of the shrivelling of industrial
citizenship and the dismantling of the old pattern of labour security in the twentieth
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century is a painful one. The question now is: “What should replace the labour-based
model that underpinned it?” The answer lies in moving away from the values of
labour to the values of work. The human being wants and needs to work, both for
productive and reproductive reasons and for creative, Promethean reasons. The
normative vision that should surely guide us is that everybody should have the right
to develop themselves through their working lives, through applying their minds,
hands and bodies to improving themselves as human beings and in contributing to
human society, through the care they provide to others and the support they give and
receive.
The idea of occupational citizenship is beginning to take shape. An occupation
necessitates the opportunity to develop one’s perceived vocation, in which the
productive, reproductive and creative aspects of work come to the fore. The trouble
with this perspective is not that it is hard to grasp, but that it leads sophisticated
minds to dismiss it as abstract and unrealistic. Go around India and you see
wretchedness and people struggling to survive. Go around the USA and you see
frenzied consumers amidst alienated, anomic individuals. Go around Brazil and
numerous other countries, and you see tensions and violence amid squalid
deprivation. In such circumstances, a vision of how work could be organized is easily
dismissed as interesting but largely irrelevant to today’s challenges. I disagree.
The originator of the vision was born well over 2,000 years ago, when the level of
material income was a fraction of today’s in any part of the world. Aristotle gave pride
of place to civic friendship and realized that if we wish to live the Good Life we must
care about the other. Work is a social activity. An occupation values civic friendship, or
what Aristotle called philia—wishing well for the other, not for your sake but for his or
hers, and sharing the values and goals of the other (Schwarzenbach, 1996). In a labour
market, there is no intrinsic place for friendship. Each individual is encouraged to see
himself or herself as being in competition with other individuals. If a person is inclined
to lower the wage at which he or she will do a task, someone else loses or has to follow.
The competition is necessarily aggressive. By contrast, in an occupation, there is or
should be a place for civic friendship. One can admire another’s workmanship, share
the craft ethic, and value a shared sense of identity. There is an intrinsic psychic value
for the work and the social relations in which the work is embedded.
For Aristotle, the perfect civic friendship was ‘character friendship’—a love for
the goodness of the other person’s whole character.4 This is why he regarded the
reproductive activity of mothers so highly. This is also why the ideal occupation is
one in which there is a place for the work of care, in which the primary objective is to
help a person become or remain an independent, mature equal capable of making
ethical judgments and of participating in balanced and structured reciprocities.
Reproduction should be construed as the activity of “bringing another person
into being”. If conceived in this way, the idea of reproduction gives a proper place to
altruism, which stands in conflict with paternalism, with the latter implying the
reproduction of my norms and expectations (or norms not chosen by yourself), rather
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than facilitating and encouraging your capacity to define your own norms and
expectations.
Work that is occupational in character allows rational decision-making by the
person doing it. To be rational, one has to be able to direct oneself (a Kantian
principle). This is part of full freedom (Taylor, 1984, p. 107). It stands resolutely
against the ‘libertarian paternalism’ that is currently sweeping through social, labour
market and economic policy, addling the brains of some distinguished academics as it
does so, including two leading advisers to Barack Obama in the US Presidential
election of 2008 (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).
In labour markets, people are effectively coerced by prices; in a true occupation,
people are motivated by dignity and morality, and by a sense of civic friendship.
Ethical mores emerge through traditions and sociability, the culture of a craft and a
craft community. They should not be enforced by the state. As Kant argued:
“For [a political community] to coerce its citizens to enter an ethical community with
each other would be a contradiction in terms, for the latter involves in its very concept
freedom from coercion… But woe to the legislator who would wish to bring about
through coercion a constitution directed to ethical ends. For he would not only bring
about the exact opposite of his ethical goals, but also undermine his political goals and
render them insecure.”5
This amounts to strong criticism of state paternalism, and implicit support for
occupational citizenship. And yet paternalism is increasingly what is on offer from
‘think tanks’, advisers to politicians, political parties and social engineers posing as
academics6.
Traditionally, occupations have involved both productive and reproductive
aspects, binding practitioners together through civic friendship. But from the late
eighteenth century onwards, a productivist bias created a breach between productive
and reproductive forms of work. The error of labourism and the system of industrial
citizenship, which reached its apex in the mid-twentieth century, was that it gave a
strong bias to labour that produced goods, or that facilitated the production of goods,
and systematically neglected reproductive work. An early contributor to this bias was
Adam Smith, who classified occupations that were reproductive or service-oriented
as unproductive labour, including the work of religious workers, doctors, men of
letters, dancers, opera singers, actors and servants, whose work “perishes in the very
instance of its performance” (Smith, 1981, pp. 330-31).
Kant too contributed to this nonsense, denying citizenship to those doing what
we now call service work. More than a century after Adam Smith’s faux pas, Arthur
Pigou pithily identified another problem. He pointed out that if he hired a
housekeeper, national income went up, as did employment, whereas if he then
married her and she continued to do the same work, national income and
employment went down. In other words, productive work was measured not by
what you did but for whom you did it and on what terms.
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The silliness of the treatment of work and labour reached its peak during the
twentieth century. Putting as many people as possible into jobs became the goal of
social and economic policy, and the work of unpaid care and all the ethical activity
involved in community work and voluntary work was simply discounted. The
hegemonic labour force statistics made those forms of work invisible.
In the twenty-first century, we must rescue not only these forms of reproductive
work but also the reproductive work that takes place inside occupations, seeing such
work not only as nurturing and caring, as within the family, but also as involving acts of
civic friendship that help to reproduce meaningful communities based on principles of
sharing, reciprocity and social solidarity, or fraternity. An occupational community has
always included a place for life-cycle reproduction and reciprocities. A labour market
eschews such considerations.
Thinking in terms of occupations should lead to consideration of how people
could choose the work they do in a way that would enable them to realize as much of
their human capabilities and aspirations as possible, subject to the Kantian dictate
that they should not do harm to others.
Of course, in translating that into an egalitarian agenda, one would need to add
several caveats. But an agenda that began by wishing to promote opportunity to
pursue the type of work people wish to do, would lead to quite different policies and
institutional requirements than one wishing to maximize commercial production,
wherein the worker is instrumental and the over-riding criterion is maximizing
economic growth and GDP. The folly of the labourist model of social democracy was
that individuals were treated as instrumental rather than as working people with
needs, aspirations and capabilities that matter to them.
Now consider what occupation implies. We all exist with bundles of interests and
capabilities. In our working lives, we look back to traditions of crafts and professions.
But we should also look back to what has been taken away from the idea of dignifying
work by the hegemony of capitalist labour organization.
For the ancient Greeks, the only work worthy of citizenship was that associated
with civic friendship, which meant work in and around the house with close friends
and relations, mixing with fellow citizens. By the Middle Ages, the guilds had
emerged to provide institutional security for those in specific occupational
communities. The guilds existed as societies within a society, giving their members a
network in which reproductive and social work could co-exist with directly
productive work. The guilds had their shortcomings, being hierarchical and prone to
conservatism, but they retained for their members a control over the diverse activities
encompassed by the occupation coupled with recognition of social reciprocity and
mutual dependence, essential attributes of citizenship.
What is happening in the middle phase of the Global Transformation is that,
while labour recommodification is taking place, occupations are being restructured
and made subject to international, national and sub-national regulation. People may
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seek an occupational identity—I am an economist, a dentist, a teacher, and so on—but
they have to do so in conditions where their control over their work trajectories is
constantly under threat, if not absent altogether, as in the case of most of those in the
precariat. The main reason for this is that occupations are in conflict with the market,
which tends to commodify everything and to make all activities subject only to the
dictates of competition and efficiency.
The challenges this dilemma poses can be appreciated by the recollection that the
most dehumanizing aspect of the labourist model of the twentieth century was the
systematic denial of the worthiness of work that is not labour. Smith and Kant may
have had their predecessors, but they started the rot in mainstream social thinking in
dismissing personalized service activities as unproductive. Alfred Marshall and
Pigou understood the later manifestation of this way of thinking, but could do
nothing about it. Besides the housekeeper-turned-wife aphorism, the stupidity of the
modern way of looking at work can be illustrated by numerous realistic scenarios. For
instance, if two people have adjoining gardens and agree that one should do the
digging for both gardens, whereas the other would do the harvesting for both, they
could be considered to be ‘working’, whereas if each did their own garden only, their
work would not be counted in economic or labour market terms.
Throughout the ages, the definable occupations—crafts and ‘professions’—have
stood against labour commodification. They have done so by creating and defending
occupational communities. In the Middle Ages, building on much earlier models,
occupations were shaped in guilds in the towns and cities of Europe. Such
organizations have always existed in various forms in Europe, China, India and
elsewhere, giving their members a strong sense of community, status and identity.
The attack on modern variants of occupational guilds in the globalization era has
been increasingly successful. The attack has been conducted in the name of claims
about competition. But occupational communities are required to give space for
craftsmanship, ‘professionalism’, work ethics, and forms of learning and sharing.
AN AGENDA FOR DECOMMODIFICATION
What would a strategy for occupational security and citizenship look like? The
normative vision is that a Good Society would be one in which more and more people
were able to pursue their own sense of occupation in conditions of equal basic
security.
We need to start by accepting that the market economy will remain dominant for
the foreseeable future. We should go further, and accept the fact that labour is a
commodity, so that those supplying labour should be paid a money wage determined
by individual and collective bargaining and through proper contracts.
A crucial step towards a universal and egalitarian society is to delink basic
economic security from labour, by finding ways of providing everybody with basic
income security. This is not some utopian dream. It is beginning in some countries,
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and it must start with the recognition that what is being proposed is moving towards
a claim right to basic security. At the moment, many rich countries are moving away
from the realization of that right.
First, labour law should be phased out and become part of common law. At
present, around the world, labour law exists to protect employees in their dealings
with employers. In the flexible labour process, this leaves out an enormous number of
people who work, even according to conventional definitions of ‘worker’. Attempts
to extend the definition of ‘employee’, as recommended recently in Australia
(Bromberg and Irving, 2007), are arbitrary, convoluted and almost certainly
ineffective. Extension still leaves a dichotomy.
The trouble is compounded because the law blocks those pursuing occupations
from coalescing to represent their member practitioners and to bargain on their
behalf. As independent contractors, they run up against anti-trust rules of the market
economy. In Canada, a special law was passed to allow freelance artists and ‘editors’
to organize and bargain collectively. The difficulty then is to identify the party with
which occupational groups can bargain.
In practice, occupations—professions, in the main—have established legal
‘rights’ by means of licences and certification schemes, implemented by the state or
legitimized by it. These are supposed to protect the consumer and the professional
standards and ethics of the various occupations. But critics claim that licensing
(requiring everybody wishing to practise work of a particular type to be licensed)
interferes with the citizen’s right to practise. In the USA, this has been depicted as
contrary to the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution.
This problem is resolvable, partly by shifting to a certification system, instead of a
licensing one. But that should be accompanied by stronger mechanisms to establish
or maintain occupational associations governed by principles of deliberative
democracy. There should be space for ‘collaborative bargaining’ between groups with
diverse interests, including groups contesting the right to practise particular types of
work.
Meanwhile, the social protection system should be developed in a way that could
strengthen occupational citizenship. In the twentieth century, the main ways of
funding social protection were through employment-based contributions and direct
taxation. But what if the firm metamorphoses into little more than a centre of finance,
technology and marketing, while contracting out labour functions to groups and
individuals, proficians at the upper end and the precariat at the lower end, all
regarded as ‘independent contractors’? People will not feel that they belong to a
specific firm, a specific industry or a specific job. Where will be their source of social
protection? One possibility is that they will be able to look to their occupational
community—a modern guild—created to serve the needs and aspirations of
contributing members.
This could only be a second platform of a new social protection system—
replacing old-style social insurance. In other words, the occupational body would act
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as a source of both regulation and social protection. This could function equitably and
efficiently only if it were underpinned by basic income security, a universal base.
A basic income scheme should provide just enough to give everybody the means
to cover their basic needs, to give them a life of dignity. Basic means that it must be
meaningful enough to enable an individual to say to those treating her badly, “No!” A
basic income would, for the first time, give dignified meaning to the right to work.
Take a low-income country such as Namibia or India. If basic economic security
were to come from an unconditional basic income grant, a second platform of income
security might come from the construction of occupational social funds. These could be
mainly financed by contributions from occupational practitioners—a form of social
solidarity that is more realistic in a modern, flexible labour process. Such funds built
within a community would put moral pressure on members to lower their risk
exposure and to take care. New guilds could look like occupational cooperatives.
One lesson derived from the rise and fall of the twentieth-century labourist
models is that no system of social protection can be sustained unless it builds on, and
accentuates, a perception of legitimate social solidarity and reciprocity. That
perception is likely to disappear if the contributors feel that they are paying too much
or if the various class strata feel that they have a low probability of needing income
support, or even worse, believe that they would not obtain support if it were needed.
Inside an occupational community, there are winners and losers. But there is a
relatively high probability of an appreciation of occupational reciprocity built on
understandable and time-honoured ideas of fraternity, of civic friendship. This is a
universalism worth building, for if we believe that humans are intrinsically equal,
each and every person, with a few exceptions, should be able to find a place in an
occupational community reflecting their human capacities.
Such a society must be built on the premise of universal basic security. In order to
be good, people have to be trusted to be good. This is the fundamental rationale for
moving steadily towards a society with a basic income. Nevertheless, a basic income
can only be politically feasible if it is depicted as part of a comprehensive structure of
income support and redistribution. This leads us to a third platform or tier. At
present, there is no realistic prospect of the precariat receiving adequate incomes
when they are in jobs and they have no adequate income protection when they are
outside employment. It is also likely that more of those in core jobs will not be able to
receive adequate incomes from their employment. The only way to redress the
structural inequality between ‘capital’ and ‘labour’ is to redistribute the income going
to capital away from a privileged minority to those working to produce the profits
and the communities that bear the social costs of having profitable enterprises in their
midst. And such communities, of course, could include virtual communities, should
that seem appropriate.
The mechanisms of capital sharing must be linked to the occupational freedom
agenda. In an open economy, raising tax rates on profit would risk capital flight, and
would be hard to implement politically. There must be incentives to share the capital
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income. One way for achieving this might be for the state to offer subsidized liability
insurance on condition that a predetermined part of the profits went into a social
fund to be distributed to local communities in the form of social and development
funds.
The process would be helped by the establishment of largely self-regulating, self-
developing occupational communities, which could produce and maintain a body of
people with the skills and commitment needed to encourage productive investment.
This could cover the vital area of ‘capability development’. Instead of firms indulging
in expensive and notoriously inadequate training schemes, it would be better to
arrange for payment of an equal amount into occupational development funds,
leaving it to the occupational communities to reproduce competent practitioners.
This would be more likely to produce broad competencies and an efficient and
progressive use of profit income.
Similarly, occupational communities may be better placed than conventional
trade unions or companies for creating funds to provide contingency benefits for
their members and their families, and could provide what would amount to private
portable benefits. It would be up to them to deal with the moral and immoral hazards
associated with their schemes, and they could erect appropriate governance
structures, based on principles of deliberative democracy.
The essence of citizenship is rights, and this leads back to ideas of democracy.
Occupational associations should be based on deliberative democracy and
governance structures that could limit monopolistic behaviour and opportunism.
There is a need to combat the blockage of occupational bargaining via anti-trust
legislation.
CONCLUDING POINTS
Socio-economic analysis is always driven by a normative vision. We need a normative
base—and an underlying theory of justice—to make sure that we focus on the
concepts and categories that make sense for our concerns. In that regard, it is worth
concluding by adding a note of caution about the overwhelming focus on ‘poverty’
and ‘the poor’ in mainstream reports and economic analysis. The orthodox thinkers
want us to focus on those notions. They do not want us to focus on the socio-
economic structures and processes, and the class configuration associated with them,
let alone an egalitarian vision that blends freedom and equality.
By focusing on poverty, you can direct policy and political attention towards
changing the features, attitudes and behaviour of ‘the poor’. And very easily, you can
fall into a trap of dividing this strange, much-measured group into the ‘deserving’
and the ‘undeserving’ poor, alongside the ‘transgressing’ poor, those who are not only
‘undeserving’ but who then go on to break the law in order to survive or improve
their lot. Means testing goes in that direction, and so do the Benthamite libertarian
paternalists that are currently dominating social and labour policy.
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A demand is placed on ‘the poor’, who were once seen as a ‘target’ group, that if
they wish to be benevolently helped, by the state, by international donors, by the
international financial agencies, by the ‘rich’, and by ‘politicians’, they must first
demonstrate ‘socially responsible behaviour’. There are ‘no rights without
responsibilities’! Selectivity, conditionality and an ethos of charity, rather than an
agenda of real rights, soon build up. A vision of equality and universality should
focus on class and the dynamics of distribution that are characterizing the ongoing
Global Transformation, not on some disembodied notion of ‘the poor’.
More generally, besides hoping for economic growth to trickle down to the poor
or using fiscal policy in ways that seem unfeasible in the Global Transformation, there
are three ways to reduce poverty, inequality and economic insecurity—the labour line,
the commodity line (the provision of goods and services), and the cash line. India, like
many other countries, has tended to prefer the first two and to disregard the third.
The first two approaches are necessarily and always selective. A government
cannot guarantee everybody a job—and the language used to suggest that this is
what is being intended when proponents talk of ‘guaranteed employment’, or in
moments of euphoria ‘full employment’, is blatantly disingenuous, dishonest or naïve.
What the proponents actually mean is a selective scheme to provide a selected social
group with some labour in return for some remuneration, which usually means a bad
job paying a bad income.
The arguments against the labour line have been well-rehearsed, and have not
been effectively answered. Among the objections are their effect on the wages of
‘unskilled’ workers outside the schemes, and the claims that they involve large
‘deadweight’ effects (doing activities that would be done anyhow) and large
substitution effects (displacing others doing such work). They also bring into
question the principle that employment should be ‘freely chosen’, enshrined in
various international conventions and declarations.
The second route to alleviating economic insecurity and poverty is the
commodity line, whereby the state directly transfers goods or services, providing
them either for free or at subsidized prices. Here too, the claims made by politicians
can be deceiving. The criteria for selection make any such scheme far from
universalistic, and as with selective employment schemes, they typically suffer from
inefficiency through both Type A and Type B errors and market-distorting effects.
Implicitly, they assume that what the poor or the insecure lack is food (or
whatever the good being provided). They have an economic failing in that they
distort consumption patterns, inducing consumers to undervalue the goods being
supplied and acting as a deterrent to the market provision of those goods. A vast
amount of evidence also attests to waste, costly delivery and petty corruption. Except
in emergencies, such schemes should surely not be used as a primary policy tool.
This leads to consideration of the cash line. If one favours a market economy but
not a full market society, one is tempted to reflect on a saying of Confucius: “The
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easiest way out is through the door. Why do so few make use of it?”
If one believes that economic insecurity and poverty are primarily about a lack of
assured command over resources and assets, the cash line offers at least a partial
solution, which would become less partial if combined with interventions to
redistribute key assets. Indeed, it would help if we could understand that providing
people with assured cash payments would enable them to gain at least some control
over the key assets of time and security, the loss of which is remarkably easy in a
commercialized society.
As a way of lessening poverty and insecurity, cash transfers are defendable on
several grounds. One is that they can boost the economy and generate livelihood
opportunities. Another is that they do not involve the labour market and economic
distortions that come with the labour and goods lines. They increase consumer
demand where it is most likely to raise productive activity and employment, rather
than where it is likely to raise the demand for imported ‘luxury’ goods. They enable
beneficiaries to have not only a greater sense of security but also control over their
lives, with an assurance that the basic needs of their immediate family will be met.
For these and other reasons, they deserve fresh consideration, without the fancy
paternalistic ‘conditionality’ with which too many cash transfer schemes have been
burdened. However, above all, egalitarians should be pleased by their freedom-
enhancing qualities.
NOTES
1. For that analysis, see Standing (2002), and Standing (2009).
2. I am using ‘class’ in the classic sense of having specific relationships with ‘means of
production’ and the state, which creates the main system of regulations, social protection and
redistribution.
3. Using available statistics, I have estimated that about 25 per cent of the working-age
population in South Africa is in the precariat there, and would guess that it is a higher and
rising proportion of the workforce in other countries.
4. In the Nichomachean Ethics, he described a friend as ‘another self’. Kant took exception to
Aristotle’s view, seeing the need to treat all others equally. Soren Kierkegaard, taking a
Christian view, said friendships that exclude anybody are impermissible. This seems to mix
friendship with the more diffuse notion of civility, which is a form of alienation, since civility
produces no sense of liberation or social solidarity. Civility is not to be dismissed, but is
limited to matters of process, whereas friendship is about substance as well. Civility is about
how one treats strangers and about how one would wish to be treated by them. Friendship is
about forging eudaemia, about intimacy.
5. Cited in Taylor (1984), p. 109.
6. The list of converts includes Julian Le Grand, who moved from the London School of
Economics (LSE) and Bristol University to become a ‘Downing Street adviser’, to devise
schemes for advancing ‘paternalistic libertarianism’ on behalf of Britain’s New Labour
Government. He wants to leave ‘freedom of choice’ but raise the costs of doing certain actions
deemed unacceptable so as to encourage people to make the appropriate choices.
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